This paper proposes a new strategy for modeling and solving state-dependent forward guidance policies (SCFG). We study its transmission channels using a DSGE model with search and matching frictions in which agents account for the fact that the SCFG is an endogenous regime-switching system. A fully credible SCFG causes a boom in inflation and output but no rapid exit from the ZLB. Thus, the transmission of its effects is primarily through the realization of additional ZLB periods more than through changes in expectations. We next consider the implications of imperfect credibility. In this case of uncertainty, an SCFG is less impactful. Finally, using counterfactual experiments on the December 2012 FOMC statement, we find that it led to about 1.5 pp gain in unemployment and 0.5 pp in inflation.
Keywords: New Keynesian model, Search and matching, ZLB, Forward guidance.
JEL codes: E30, J60.
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