Publications

Using US firm-level data from 1985-2019, this paper investigates how the characteristics of matches between acquirers and targets of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) vary over the business cycle. We document several findings. (1) Acquirers are on average larger, more profitable, and in a stronger financial position than targets. (2) Targets are more innovative than acquirers, and (3) M&A targets during a recession have worse financial health but higher levels of innovation compared to M&A targets in booms. Our empirical evidence suggests that an economy may benefit from an economy may benefit from adjusting its antitrust stance over the business cycle.

Keywords: mergers, M&A, business cycle, R&D, productivity

JEL codes: E22, E32, G34

This paper investigates how the introduction of a central bank digital currency (CBDC) impacts the banking sector. The deposit market is modeled as a Salop circle and deposits are subject to liquidity shocks. Absent a CBDC the interbank market can redistribute liquidity between banks. However, the central bank does not take part in the interbank market and CBDC leads to greater reliance of the banking sector on central bank standing facilities. The model shows adjusting the remuneration rate of CBDC has little pass-through to the deposit rate set by banks and may have implications for transmission of monetary policy.

Keywords: central bank digital currency, banking, money, interbank Market.

JEL Classification: E42, E52, E58, G21.

The impact of creditor and debtor rights following firm insolvency are studied in a firm dynamics model where defaulting firms choose between restructuring or exit. The model accounts for differing effects of productivity shocks across economies that differ in the credit/debtor rights. Following a negative shock labour productivity falls sharply in a creditor-friendly regime such as the UK while in a debtor-friendly regime such as the US, there is a larger employment response. This paper suggests a possible explanation for the different employment and labour productivity response in the UK and US since the financial crisis.  

JEL Codes: D21, E22, G33.

The views expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the Bank of Lithuania.

This paper explores the impact of banking regulation on a competitive credit market with ex-ante asymmetric information and aggregate uncertainty. I construct a model where the government to impose a regulatory constraint that limits the losses banks make in the event of their default. I show that the addition of banking regulation results in three deviations from the standard theory. First, collateral is demanded of both high and low risk firms, even in the absence of asymmetric information. Second, if banking regulation is sufficiently strict, there may not exist an adverse selection problem. Third, a pooling Nash equilibrium can exist.

JEL Codes: D86, G21, G28.

The views expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the Bank of Lithuania.